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INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff, Deanna Kleinert, was injured in an elevator at 
185 South State Street when the elevator malfunctioned. Defendant 
Kimball Elevator Company ("Kimball") manufactured, installed and 
maintained the elevator. Defendants the Boyer Company, 185 South 
State Associates, Boyer-Gardner Properties Partnership, H. Roger 
Boyer, Kern C. Gardner and 185 South State Owners7 Association (the 
"Boyer defendants") owned or managed the building, including the 
elevators. The trial court granted Kimball's and the Boyer 
defendants' motions for summary judgment and denied Ms. Kleinert's 
motion for leave to amend her complaint to allege res ipsa 
loquitur. This appeal challenges those rulings. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The defendants are correct in stating that a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment is reviewed under a correction of error 
standard. But because summary judgment denies a party the 
opportunity to present its case on the merits, in deciding whether 
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues 
of material fact, this court must review the facts and inferences 
from those facts in the light most favorable to the losing party 
(Ms. Kleinert) and overturn the summary judgment if a genuine issue 
of material fact exists. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 737 
P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). In determining whether a genuine issue 
of material fact exists, the court must construe any doubts or 
uncertainties concerning the facts in favor of Ms. Kleinert. 
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Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 263 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). 
REPLY TO DEFENDANTS7 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendants have overstated the deposition testimony they 
rely on for their statements of the case. 
For example, the Boyer defendants state that Lee Peterson, the 
property manager of the building's common areas, was not aware 
before Ms. Kleinert's accident of any problems with the elevators 
dropping or rising rapidly, was not aware that an elevator even 
could operate in the manner Ms. Kleinert described and had noticed 
only "minor, generic problems common to all elevators" before the 
accident. See Brief of Appellees at 3. Although Mr. Peterson 
testified that he had never heard any rumors before March 1987 that 
the elevators at 185 South State had a tendency to drop or rise 
rapidly, other types of problems with the elevators had been 
reported to him. See R. at 395 f 5. He had notice of elevators 
breaking down, not working, stopping and catching people inside. 
He testified that he had received complaints about elevators not 
responding to calls or going to the wrong floor. Id. at 396 f 7. 
He further testified that the elevators at 185 South State caused 
him special concern because they had "a higher incidence of 
elevator malfunctions" than the elevators at other properties he 
had managed. See id. at 401 f 19. Moreover, although he had not 
heard of an elevator operating in the manner the plaintiff 
described, Mr. Peterson did not purport to be an elevator expert. 
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He did not remember specifically studying elevator operation or 
maintenance in his training as a property manager. His formal 
education was in business finance. Id. at 395-96 f 6. 
The defendants state that Kenneth L. Fuller, the elevator 
technician responsible for servicing the elevators at 185 South 
State, testified that the elevators were equipped with numerous 
safety devices and that it would be "impossible" for the elevators 
to operate in the manner Ms. Kleinert described. In fact, Mr. 
Fuller merely testified that the elevators had electrical and 
mechanical override switches that were supposed to stop the 
elevators if they went a certain percentage over their rated 
running speed but would not necessarily stop the elevators from 
moving erratically and stopping abruptly, as Ms. Kleinert claimed 
the elevator did. See id. at 328-30. Mr. Fuller further testified 
that he did not know at what speed the override switches were set 
and that they could be altered. Id. Finally, Mr. Fuller testified 
that it was "highly unlikely" for the elevators to operate in the 
manner Ms. Kleinert described and that it was "[iImpossible to my 
knowledge," not that it was physically impossible, as the 
defendants claim. See id. at 289 & 331. 
The defendants claim that Ross A. Harrison serviced the 
elevators at 185 South State for approximately two years and that 
he had never heard of an elevator operating in the manner Ms. 
Kleinert described. In fact, Mr. Harrison had only serviced the 
elevators for a year to a year and one-half and testified that he 
had not heard of the elevators in that building (not any elevator) 
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operating in the manner Ms. Kleinert described. See id. at 396-97 
M 11 & 12. 
Ted Bambrough testified, as the defendants state, that he had 
never heard of an elevator operating in the manner the plaintiff 
described. However, Mr. Bambrough also testified, among other 
things, that he could "document several cases" where people had 
started an elevator bouncing and "trip[ped] it electrically," 
causing it to go up and down, id. at 127 & 333, and that Kimball 
had had a "common problem" with the elevators at 185 South State in 
that someone "kept opening the return panels on all the cars . . . 
[to get] into the workings of the buttons and the computer and all 
that stuff," id. at 335. Mr. Bambrough also testified that he was 
not familiar with the way the elevators at 185 South State 
functioned. See id. at 397 f 13. 
Finally, the defendants cite the testimony of Brent J. Russon, 
Kimball's manager. Mr. Russon testified that he was familiar with 
the elevators in question, but his familiarity with the elevators 
consisted merely of handling the paperwork for their servicing and 
of having "been in the building several times." See id. at 397 
f 15. Mr. Russon claimed that it was impossible for an elevator to 
drop and stop and go and stop in the manner described by the 
plaintiff. However, Mr. Russon also testified that his experience 
in the elevator industry had been primarily in management positions 
and that he had never serviced an elevator. The only training he 
had ever received regarding the way an elevator functions was some 
introductory courses covering only "very basic levels of 
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electricity, general safety, material handling and this type of 
general training.11 id. at 337-38. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY RAISED A GENUINE ISSUE 
OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO WHETHER THE ELEVATOR 
WAS DEFECTIVE. 
Kimball claims, and the trial court agreed, that the 
plaintiff's product liability claim failed as a matter of law 
because the plaintiff could not prove a defect in the elevator. 
The plaintiff agrees that she has the burden of proving at 
trial that the elevator was in a defective condition that made in 
unreasonably dangerous to the user. See Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. 
Armco Steel Co. , 601 P.2d 152, 156, 158 (Utah 1979). See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1) (1992). Kimball argues that there is a 
presumption under section 78-15-6 that the elevator in this case 
was not defective. The plaintiff agrees that, if the statute 
applies, the presumption also applies.1 However, the statutory 
1
 There is a serious question as to whether the statute even 
applies. Although the statute was originally enacted before the 
plaintiff's accident, it was later declared unconstitutional. See 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 717 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985). 
Because an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio, it is as if 
it had never been passed. See, e.g.
 f Nevada Power Co. v. 
Metropolitan Dev. Co.. 765 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (Nev. 1988). Thus, 
when the plaintiff's claim arose, there was no valid statute in 
effect. Although the statute was later reenacted without its 
unconstitutional provision, Utah statutes are not retroactive 
"unless expressly so declared," Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986), and 
section 78-15-6 does not say it is retroactive. The court need not 
decide the applicability of the statute, however, because the 
result in this case is the same whether the statute applies or not. 
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presumption is "rebuttable." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3). A 
rebuttable presumption does not take an issue away from the jury 
unless there is no contrary evidence. The effect of the 
presumption is to place on the plaintiff the burden of going 
forward with evidence of a product defect (a burden she had whether 
or not the statute applies). If the plaintiff produces any 
evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably find that 
the elevator was defective, the presumption disappears, and the 
plaintiff is entitled to have the jury consider her claim. See 
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. , 121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 
764, 769 (1952). 
Ms. Kleinert's testimony about how the elevator acted in this 
case, see R. at 342-52, raised a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the elevator was defective, sufficient to get to a jury. 
A jury could reasonably infer from her testimony that the elevator 
was in a defective condition (that is, one not contemplated by the 
user) that made it unreasonably dangerous to the user. Elevators 
simply do not act as the elevator in this case did unless they are 
somehow defective. 
Kimball argues, however, and the trial court apparently 
agreed, that the plaintiff's testimony was not competent evidence 
of a product defect, that a plaintiff must have expert testimony of 
a product defect before she can get to a jury. 
Neither the statute nor the case law requires a plaintiff to 
prove a product defect by expert testimony. The statute is silent 
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as to how a plaintiff must prove a defect, so unless the cases 
require expert testimony, the trial court erred in requiring it. 
Under Utah law, expert testimony is not required if "the 
matter is one which is within the knowledge of the average trier of 
fact." Salt Lake City Sch. Dist. v. Galbraith & Green, Inc.r 740 
P. 2d 284, 289 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). "If the 
jury is capable of understanding the primary facts of the case and 
drawing correct conclusions from them, no expert testimony is 
required." Id. A jury would certainly be capable of understanding 
Ms. Kleinert's description of events, and it does not take an 
expert to conclude that, if the elevator actually acted as the 
plaintiff claims it acted, it must have been defective. The 
average lay person knows that elevators are not supposed to act 
like a "human Martini mixer," to use Kimball's colorful phrase. 
Expert testimony is only necessary if the issue is "one which 
requires special knowledge not held by the trier of fact." Id. 
Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical. Inc.. 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), the only case Kimball has cited in which expert testimony 
was required, was just such a case. The issues in that case were 
whether a drug manufactured by the defendant caused the plaintiff's 
injuries and whether the doctor who prescribed the drug breached 
the applicable standard of care. The court required expert medical 
testimony to establish causation2 and breach of the applicable 
standard of care because "these matters are outside the knowledge 
2
 Kimball's motion did not challenge the plaintiff's claim 
that her elevator ride caused her injuries. 
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and experience of laypeople.11 See 764 P. 2d at 640. By contrast, 
whether or not an elevator is in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user is peculiarly within the knowledge of 
laypeople, the average users of elevators. Significantly, the 
court in Reeves did not say that the plaintiff had to have expert 
testimony to prove that the product was defective if it in fact 
caused the plaintiff's injuries. In that case, a jury could infer 
a defect. 
None of the other cases Kimball cites requires expert 
testimony either. In neither Ernest W. Hahnf Inc. v. Armco Steel 
Company, 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), nor Dowland v. Lyman Products 
for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982), was the competency or 
sufficiency of the evidence of product defect an issue. See Hahn, 
601 P.2d at 155; Dowland, 642 P.2d at 380, 381. In both cases, 
there was conflicting expert testimony as to whether the 
defendant's product was defective. In one case, the jury concluded 
that the product was defective, see Hahn, 601 P.2d at 158, and in 
the other case the jury concluded that it was not, see Dowland, 642 
P.2d at 382. The fact that a jury may choose to disbelieve expert 
testimony does not mean that expert testimony is always required. 
The only relevance Hahn and Dowland have to this case is to show 
that the question of product defect is for the jury to determine 
where there is conflicting evidence. 
McCarty v. F.C. Kingston Co.
 f 522 P.2d 778 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1974), did not hold, as Kimball claims, that expert testimony was 
required to show the precise engineering defect that caused the 
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plaintiff's injury. It simply held that the trial court did not 
commit reversible error when it instructed the jury that the 
plaintiff could not recover if it found that the plaintiff's 
negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 522 P.2d 
at 779-80. Although the plaintiff called an expert who testified 
that there was a defect in the defendant's product, id. at 779, 
apparently the jury did not believe the expert's testimony. 
Kimball also misrepresents the holding in Power v. Otis 
Elevator Co.. 409 So.2d 389 (La. Ct. App. 1982). The plaintiff in 
that case fell down an escalator. Her evidence at trial consisted 
of her own testimony and that of two eyewitnesses. 409 So.2d at 
390. The jury heard all the evidence and concluded that the 
escalator did not malfunction. The court emphasized that it was 
for the jury to weigh the evidence and refused to invade "the fact 
finding function of the jury." Id. at 391. 
The only case Kimball has cited in which a court upheld the 
dismissal of a products liability claim is M&R Investment Co. v. 
Anzalotti, 773 P.2d 729 (Nev. 1989). M&R did not hold that expert 
testimony of a product defect was required. Rather, the court 
found insufficient evidence of a product defect where the 
"uncontradicted testimony of [the plaintiff's] own expert witness 
established that the elevator was properly designed, manufactured 
and installed." 773 P. 2d at 731. In this case, on the other hand, 
the plaintiff's evidence unequivocally shows that the elevator 
malfunctioned, from which one could infer a product defect. 
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The clear weight of authority from other jurisdictions rejects 
Kimball's argument that expert testimony of a product defect is 
always required. In fact, a number of cases have confirmed that 
testimony that a product malfunctioned or that an accident 
involving the product occurred is sufficient to get to a jury on 
the issue of product defect. See, e.g.. Knight v. Otis Elevator 
Co.. 596 F.2d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 1979) (proof of a specific defect is 
not required to get to a jury in an elevator case; a malfunction 
itself is sufficient to make the existence of a defect a jury 
question in the absence of abnormal use and reasonable secondary 
causes) (applying Pennsylvania law); Ruiz v. Otis Elevatorf 703 
P.2d 1247, 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (elevator malfunction is 
sufficient evidence of defect to get to a jury); Van Zee v. Bayview 
Hardware Store, 74 Cal. Rptr. 21, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (a 
plaintiff need only establish that he was injured while using the 
product as it was intended to be used; a jury can find liability 
without expert testimony); Cassisi v. Maytag Co.f 396 So.2d 1140, 
1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (a legal inference of defectiveness 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case for the jury arises when 
a product malfunctions during normal operation) (citations 
omitted); Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co.. 265 N.E.2d 212, 217 (111. 
App. Ct. 1970) (evidence that product failed to perform in the 
manner reasonably to be expected is sufficient to make a prima 
facie case); Marquez v. City Stores Co., 371 So.2d 810, 813-14 (La. 
1979) (a defect sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff 
could be inferred from the mere fact of an accident on an 
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escalator); Caldwell v. Fox. 231 N.W.2d 46, 51 (Mich. 1975) 
(driver's testimony that brakes failed was sufficient evidence of 
a defect in the brake system to raise a jury question). If more 
were required, "the supposed benefit of the theory of strict 
liability would be lost to the . . . public." Bradenburaer v. 
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.. Inc., 513 P.2d 268, 275 (Mont. 1973). 
In short, a jury could infer from the plaintiff's testimony 
about how the elevator in this case acted that the elevator was in 
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. The jury 
may choose to disbelieve Ms. Kleinert's testimony, or it may decide 
not to draw an inference of product defect from that testimony. 
But it is for the jury to decide what conclusions are most 
reasonable given all the facts and circumstances; it was not for 
the trial court to weigh the conflicting evidence on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
II. 
THERE WAS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER THE BOYER DEFENDANTS KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF 
THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OF THE ELEVATOR. 
There was also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the Boyer defendants knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have known of the dangerous condition of the elevator at 
185 South State, precluding summary judgment in favor of the Boyer 
defendants. 
The undisputed facts showed that the elevators at 185 South 
State were continually breaking down and that people had been stuck 
in the elevators numerous times before Ms. Kleinert was trapped. 
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See R. at 400 f 17. The defendants claim that no one complained 
about the dangerous condition of the elevators before Ms. 
Kleinert's accident.3 In fact, there were numerous complaints 
about problems with the elevators. See R. at 400 f 17. Ms. 
Kleinert herself had been stuck in the elevators three or four 
times before the accident on April 16, 1984, and had reported the 
problems through proper channels. See id. at 399 ff 10-11. The 
property manager for the Boyer Company testified that he had notice 
of the elevators breaking down, not working, stopping and catching 
people inside and not responding to calls or going to the wrong 
floor. See id. at 396 f 7. He further testified that the 
elevators in the building caused him special concern because they 
had "a higher incidence of elevator malfunctions" than the 
elevators in other properties he managed. See id. at 401 f 19. 
Moreover, there had been a "common problem" with people getting 
into the workings of the elevators and bypassing the switches. Id. 
at 335; see also id. at 397 f 13 & 401 f 18. The condition of the 
elevators was a common joke among the building tenants. See id. at 
400 ff 13-15. Ms. Kleinert's employer testified, for example, that 
he had heard talk around the office that the elevators were not 
working properly, that the lights would not come on and that the 
elevators would not stop at a floor. Id. at 443-44; see also id. 
3
 The defendants also claim that there were no reports of 
similar incidents after the accident. In fact, after the 
plaintiff's accident, two other persons experienced a similar 
problem with one of the elevators at 185 South State. They claimed 
that the elevator fell approximately three floors, reaching a high 
rate of speed, then stopped abruptly, throwing them against the 
side railing and floor. See R. at 401 f 20. 
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at 400 f 16. At a minimum, the evidence raised a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the defendants had notice that the 
elevators were in a dangerous condition and hence were negligent. 
Cf. Jacobi v. Builders" Realty Co., 164 P. 394, 395 (Cal. 1917) 
(where an elevator was frequently out of order, it was negligence 
for the owner not to have adequately warned and protected tenants 
against the dangers attendant upon its use in its defective 
condition). 
The Boyer defendants do not dispute any of these facts. 
Rather, the gist of their argument appears to be that they could 
not be liable because they did not have prior notice that the 
elevator had ever acted in precisely the way Ms. Kleinert claimed 
it acted. However, the fact that no one had previously known the 
elevator in this case to act precisely as Ms. Kleinert claims it 
acted "does not conclude the issue." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723, 728 (Utah 1985). "The mere fact that a particular kind of 
accident has not happened before does not . . . show that such 
accident is one which might not reasonably have been anticipated." 
Id. (quoting Weirum v. RKO Gen. , Inc. , 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975), 
which in turn was quoting Ridley v. Grifall Trucking Co., 289 P.2d 
31, 34 (Cal. 1955)).4 
4
 Similarly, the fact that weekly inspections of the 
elevators did not disclose the defect does not conclude the matter. 
Other courts have held that proof that an elevator was in good 
condition at some time before and some time after the accident is 
not conclusive of its condition at the time of the accident and 
does not justify taking the issue of negligence away from the jury. 
See, e.g. , Haag v. Harris, 48 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1935); Gallachicco v. 
State, 43 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441 (Ct. CI. 1943). Cf. McGowan v. 
Devonshire Hall Apts., 420 A.2d 514, 518-19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) 
- 13 -
Other courts have found that problems with an elevator 
generally may be sufficient to put a property owner on notice of a 
dangerous condition.5 For example, in Conerly v. Liptzen, 
199 N.W.2d 833 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972), the court held that the trial 
judge had properly refused to take a similar case from the jury 
where there was evidence that the elevator was constantly 
malfunctioning, putting the defendant on notice of dangerous 
irregularities, despite the fact that the defendant had offered 
unrebutted testimony that the elevator could not have fallen, as 
the plaintiff claimed it did. 199 N.W.2d at 835-37. See also 
Strong v. Henra Realty Corp., 453 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194 (App. Div. 
1982) (where there was evidence that the owner had actual notice 
that an elevator was not functioning properly, it could be charged 
with negligence); Cramer v. Merqard. 11 N.E.2d 108, 109-10 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1937) (where the defendant had notice of other occasions 
in which the elevator door had opened when the elevator was not at 
the floor and such an occurrence would have been impossible if the 
elevator was in proper working condition, the defendant could be 
liable); Sweeney v. Levy, 67 Pa. D. & C. 5, 7 (1948) (an elevator 
that is allowed to become defective in any of its essential 
(where maintenance had not uncovered a defect, there was an 
inference that the landlord had not provided for sufficiently 
thorough or frequent inspections and had thereby breached its duty 
to keep common areas over which it reserved control in a reasonably 
safe condition). 
5
 This is especially true if Utah were to follow the 
majority rule that the owner of an elevator owes a higher degree of 
care to its passengers. See, e.g. , Koenig v. 399 Corp. . 240 N.E.2d 
164, 168 (111. App. Ct. 1968). 
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operating parts is a dangerous instrumentality, and injury to a 
person lawfully using the elevator can be reasonably foreseeable). 
Moreover, even if the defendants may not have known the 
elevator in this case to act precisely as the plaintiff claimed it 
did, they were on notice of many of the problems the plaintiff 
complained of. They knew or should have known of lights in the 
elevators going out. See R. at 443-44, 400 J 14. They knew or 
should have known that the elevators had a tendency to drop floors 
and not stop at a floor. See id. at 443-44, 461 & 400 f 16. And 
they knew or should have known that people were frequently stuck in 
the elevators. See id. at 396 f 7, 399 ffl 10-11, 400 ff 13 & 17. 
From this evidence, taken as a whole, one could reasonably conclude 
that the defendants had notice that one of their elevators might 
malfunction, injuring the plaintiff. Cf. Johns v. Otis Elevator 
Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988) (evidence of substantially 
similar incidents 18 months before was sufficient for the jury to 
infer notice). 
Brown v. Crescent Stores, Inc., 776 P.2d 705 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1989), the only elevator case the Boyer defendants rely on, is 
distinguishable from this case. The plaintiff in that case was a 
ninety-year-old woman who was attending a luncheon in the 
defendant's building. As she entered an elevator after the 
luncheon, the elevator door allegedly shot out at her, knocking her 
down. The court recognized that the building owner, as an elevator 
operator, was "a common carrier owing a duty of the highest care 
for its passengers' safety compatible with the practical operation 
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of its business." 776 P.2d at 707 (citations omitted). The court 
concluded, however, that the defendant could not be liable for 
negligence absent "evidence inherently establishing that the 
occurrence was of an unusual and extraordinary character." Id. 
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Wilcoxen v. Seattle, 203 P. 2d 658 
(Wash. 1949), which in turn was quoting Keller v. Seattle, 94 P.2d 
184 (Wash. 1939)). The evidence showed that there was no device 
that could prevent an elevator door from coming into contact with 
passengers and that some contact with elevator doors "was within 
the ordinary incident of travel." Id. By contrast, the occurrence 
in this case was "of an unusual and extraordinary character." 
People do not expect to be trapped inside elevators and taken on a 
forty-minute terror ride in the dark. 
More important, the court in Brown held that evidence that the 
defendant owner had received reports of prior accidents involving 
elderly passengers in its elevators raised a question as to whether 
the owner should have reasonably anticipated an accident and taken 
precautionary measures. Id. at 709. Similarly, the undisputed 
facts in this case show that the defendants had notice of prior 
problems with the elevators, raising a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the defendants should have reasonably 
anticipated an accident and taken precautionary measures to protect 
Ms. Kleinert. 
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III. 
WHETHER THE ACCIDENT COULD HAVE HAPPENED IS A 
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT, 
Both Kimball and the Boyer defendants claim that Ms. 
Kleinert's claims must fail because the testimony of the 
defendants' experts shows that it was physically impossible for the 
elevator to act as Ms. Kleinert claimed it did. The defendants 
have overstated the evidence. Two of the defendants' five 
"experts" were not experts in the area of elevator maintenance and 
repair, and a third was not familiar with the elevators in the 
building at 185 South State. See supra. pages 2-5. Although the 
remaining witnesses testified that they had not heard of an 
elevator (or, at least, an elevator in the building at 185 South 
State) operating in the way Ms. Kleinert described, they did not 
say that it was physically impossible for an elevator to act that 
way.6 Even if they had, that would not conclude the matter. "As 
the defendant's evidence approaches complete demonstration that the 
event could not possibly have occurred, it is all the more clearly 
contradicted by the fact that it has occurred." Restatement 
6
 Indeed, the sheer number of reported cases in which 
elevators acted as the elevator in this case did show that such 
occurrences are not impossible but can reasonably be anticipated. 
See, e.g. , Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 
1964); Ferguson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 408 So.2d 659 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petition denied, 418 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 1982); 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Street. 327 So.2d 113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976); Chapman v. Turnbull Elevatorf Inc., 158 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1967); Koenia v. 399 Corp.. 240 N.E.2d 164 (111. App. Ct. 
1968); American Elevator Co. v. Briscoef 572 P.2d 534 (Nev. 1977); 
Mas v. Two Bridges Assocs., 554 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 1990); Weedon v. 
Armor Elevator Co.f 468 N.Y.S.2d 898 (App. Div. 1983); Mallor v. 
Wolk Properties. Inc.
 P 311 N.Y.S.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Bond v. 
Otis Elevator Co.r 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965). 
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(Second) of Torts § 328D comment n (1963 & 1964)• The defendants' 
testimony merely raises a credibility question, which it was 
improper for the court to resolve on summary judgment. See Reeves
 P 
764 P. 2d at 639. Courts have repeatedly held that it is for the 
jury to decide whether a given occurrence was impossible, as the 
defendant's experts claim, or whether it actually happened, as the 
plaintiff claims. See, e.g.r Conerly v. Liptzen. 199 N.W.2d 833, 
835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); McGowan v. Devonshire Hall Apts.. 420 
A.2d 514, 517-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
THE PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
The Boyer defendants argue that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a second 
amended complaint because the plaintiff had already amended her 
complaint once, the motion to file a second amended complaint was 
sought late in the course of litigation, the plaintiff was aware of 
the facts underlying her proposed second amended complaint from the 
beginning of this lawsuit and the plaintiff has failed to give any 
adequate explanation for her failure to allege res ipsa loquitur 
earlier. 
The fact that the plaintiff had already amended her complaint 
once does not mean she could not amend a second time. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(a) permits a party to amend its pleadings by 
leave of court whenever "justice so requires." There is no limit 
on the number of times a party may amend a pleading. Rather, rule 
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15 "is to be liberally construed so as to further the interests of 
justice." Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
Trials on the merits are favored, and amendment of pleadings will 
generally be permitted unless there has been undue delay, bad faith 
or undue prejudice. See Foman v. Davis. 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); 
Rincrwood v. Foreign Auto Works. Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
There is no evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in 
seeking leave to amend her complaint, and in fact the plaintiff had 
a reasonable explanation for not seeking leave to amend earlier. 
Although the plaintiff was aware of the facts underlying her 
proposed second amended complaint in 1988, when she filed her first 
complaint, two events occurred in 1990 that prompted the 
plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. First, the 
plaintiff received a report from her expert witness that failed to 
pinpoint the defect in the elevator that caused the accident, 
making it impossible for her to rely on proof of a specific defect 
at trial, as she had anticipated doing. See R. at 273-74. Second, 
the Utah Supreme Court decided Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center. 791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), which held that a 
plaintiff could rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without 
expert testimony and that multiple defendants could be held liable 
under that doctrine, thus removing the two biggest obstacles to the 
plaintiff's res ipsa loquitur claim. 
In arguing that Ms. Kleinert's motion for leave to amend was 
untimely, the defendants rely heavily on cases from other 
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jurisdictions. Of course, those cases are not controlling. "The 
rule in this state has always been to allow amendments freely where 
justice requires, and especially is this true before trial." 
Gillman v. Hansen. 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045, 1046 (1971) 
(footnote omitted). In all the Utah cases the defendants have 
cited in which the court upheld a trial court's denial of a motion 
to amend, the motion was brought shortly before a scheduled trial 
date. See Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 
1983) (amendment "would certainly have delayed the trial"); Girard, 
660 P.2d at 248 (Utah 1983) (motion made the day of trial); 
Regional Sales AgencyP Inc. v. Reichertf 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (motion made the day before trial), vacated, 830 
P.2d 252 (Utah 1992); Kelly v. Utah Power & Light Co., 746 P.2d 
1189, 1190-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (motion made about two and one-
half weeks before trial). By contrast, in this case no trial date 
had been set when the plaintiff filed her motion, and discovery was 
still ongoing. Under these circumstances, Utah courts have 
generally allowed amendments to the pleadings. See, e.g., 
Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 
187, 515 P.2d 446, 449-50 (1973); Gillman, 486 P.2d at 1046, 1047; 
Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 35-38, 148 P. 452 (1915). 
The mere fact that a motion to amend comes late in the case 
does not alone justify denying leave to amend. Hageman v. Signal 
L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1973). The critical 
factors are whether the parties have had adequate notice to meet 
new issues and whether there would be substantial prejudice to the 
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opposing party if the motion were granted. Id.; Ringwood. 786 P.2d 
at 1359-60. Prejudice is "the inconvenience and delay suffered 
when the amendment raises new issues or inserts new parties into 
the litigation." Romo v. Reyes, 548 P.2d 1186, 1188 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1976). 
The defendants did not meet their burden below of showing that 
they would be prejudiced if the plaintiff were allowed to amend. 
The defendants had notice of the plaintiff's claims from the 
beginning of this action. The plaintiff's Complaint and Amended 
Complaint both alleged that the building owner was negligent in 
that it breached its duty to the plaintiff. The doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur is simply an evidentiary doctrine to aid plaintiffs 
in proving negligence. Roylance v. Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah 
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). It is a 
procedural doctrine, not a substantive rule of law, that carries 
the plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit by allowing the jury to 
draw an inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence. 
Dalley, 791 P.2d at 196; Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980). Since res ipsa loquitur is simply a rule of evidence to 
support a negligence claim and the plaintiff had already made a 
negligence claim against the Boyer defendants, they could not have 
been prejudiced by the proposed amendment, which simply spelled out 
the plaintiff's intention to rely on the evidentiary doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur at trial. "Having notice of the 'transaction' 
described in the pleadings already on file, [the defendants] had 
notice of the legal issues which could be raised by that 
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transaction." Owen v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Ariz. 
1982). The plaintiff's proposed amendment would have done no more 
than allow the plaintiff "to obtain whatever legal relief was 
justified by the facts already established by discovery and 
admissible at trial on the original issues." Id. at 282. In fact, 
the plaintiff might have been entitled to a res ipsa loquitur 
instruction at trial if the evidence had supported such an 
instruction, even if she had not pled res ipsa loquitur. See Loos 
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 99 Utah 496, 108 P.2d 254, 258-59 
(1940). 
In short, the plaintiff's proposed amendment sought only to 
add allegations to support a negligence claim, which she had 
already made, against the same parties and regarding the same 
occurrence as those set out in her initial and amended complaints. 
All that was added was a new legal theory that would have allowed 
the plaintiff to obtain an instruction allowing the jury to infer 
negligence. It is hard to see how the amendment would have 
necessitated any undue delay or otherwise prejudiced the 
defendants. The only additional issue raised by the proposed 
amendment was whether the plaintiff could establish an evidentiary 
foundation for res ipsa loquitur. The burden was on the plaintiff 
to do so. The defendants would not have had to take any additional 
discovery, and any additional discovery they chose to take would 
have been minimal. Under these circumstances, the trial court 
abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to file a 
second amended complaint. Cf. Owenf 649 P.2d at 282-83 (it was an 
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abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend to add a claim for 
punitive damages based on allegations of one defendant's vicarious 
liability for the alleged gross negligence of the other defendant 
where a negligence claim against the other defendant was already 
before the court). 
Kimball argues that the trial court properly denied Ms. 
Kleinert leave to amend because she had not established that the 
occurrence was more likely than not caused by negligence. Kimball 
has confused the plaintiff's evidentiary burden at trial with her 
burden on a motion for leave to amend. The plaintiff agrees that 
before she can present a res ipsa loquitur claim to a jury she must 
establish an evidentiary foundation for that claim. However, the 
only substantive issue on the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend 
was whether the allegations of her proposed second amended 
complaint stated a claim.7 The plaintiff alleged that she entered 
an elevator, the doors closed, the lights went out, and for the 
next forty minutes she was thrown about the elevator as it 
repeatedly rose and fell, abruptly stopping each time. She further 
alleged that the elevator was under the exclusive management and 
control of the defendants and that she was free from any fault. 
See R. at 248, 250. One could reasonably infer from the 
7
 Kimball's opposition to that motion raised only the legal 
issue of whether a plaintiff who claims strict products liability 
can rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish the existence of a 
product defect. R. at 285-86. Ms. Kleinert did not seek to use 
res ipsa loquitur to prove her strict products liability claim. 
Rather, her res ipsa loquitur claim was an alternative to her 
strict products liability claim. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 
specifically allows a plaintiff to plead claims in the alternative. 
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plaintiff's allegations that the accident was more likely than not 
caused by someone's negligence. Indeed, the plaintiff's expert 
would have so testified. See R. at 300 J 4. Thus, the plaintiff's 
allegations stated a claim based on res ipsa loquitur* Whether or 
not she could prove that claim at trial was not an issue below. 
The trial court therefore erred in denying her the opportunity to 
prove her claim. 
The case Kimball relies on support the plaintiff's claim. In 
Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 
(Utah 1990), the plaintiff went into an operation without a burn on 
her leg and came out with a burn on her leg. As Kimball 
acknowledges, the circumstances suggested negligence, regardless of 
any expert testimony. Similarly, in this case, the plaintiff went 
into an elevator without any injuries and came out with injuries. 
These circumstances also suggest negligence, even without expert 
testimony. 
Kimball also relies on the dissent in Sanone v. J.C. Penney 
Co. . 17 Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248 (1965). That is because the 
majority held that the mere fact that the plaintiff was injured on 
the defendant's escalator was sufficient to get to a jury under the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The only difference between that 
case and this is that Sanone involved an escalator whereas this 
case involves an elevator. Unable to distinguish Sanone, Kimball 
asks this court to disregard it. Sanone, however, is the law of 
Utah, and, given that decision and the facts of this case, the 
plaintiff should have been allowed to plead res ipsa loquitur. 
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Kimball claims that Sanone makes the owner of an escalator the 
insurer of a passenger's safety even where there is no showing of 
negligence or product defect. Sanone and the other cases the 
plaintiff has relied on do not make the manufacturer or owner of an 
elevator an insurer of their passengers' safety. They merely allow 
the trier of fact to infer negligence or product defect from all of 
the facts and circumstances in the case. The jury is always free 
to find no negligence or defect, and, in fact, many do. That is 
not grounds, however, for taking the case away from the jury, as 
the trial court in this case did. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial 
court's orders granting the defendants' motions for summary 
judgment and denying the plaintiff leave to file a second amended 
complaint. 
DATED this 37+u day of July, 1992. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
H. MICHAEL DRAKE, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
(Original signature) 
- 25 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of the 
above and foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid 
thereon this 37*** day of July, 1992, to: 
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Esq. 
Russell Fericks, Esq. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
S. Baird Morgan, Esq. 
STRONG & HANNI 
Nine Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
T<faJ j W 4v»v^vvtvi^ 
(Original signature) 
- 26 -
